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NOTE
TRADE REGULATION-THE "BONA FIDE OFFER" OF SALE RE
QUIREMENT IN THE PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT:

Slatky v. Amoco Oil Co.
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Congress enacted the Petroleum Marketing Practices
Act (PMPA), I which regulates terminations and nonrenewals of gaso
line station franchises. The PMPA was passed following extensive
congressional inquiry into complaints by franchisees of unfair termina
tions and nonrenewals of their franchises by the major oil companies. 2
Title I of the PMPA, by delineating the specific grounds and precondi
tions necessary for the termination or nonrenewal of a franchise, im
poses statutory protections upon the franchise relationship for the sale
of gasoline. The PMPA further requires that, in the case of nonre
newal, the franchisor make a "bona fide offer" to sell his interest in the
leased premises to the franchisee. 3
This note discusses the PMPA and cases in which the "bona fide
offer" of sale requirement imposed by the PMPA has been interpreted.
Section I presents the historical background of the PMPA and sets out
its provisions. Section II discusses the conflicting case law interpreting
the term "bona fide offer." Some courts have used an objective stanI. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-41 (1982».
2. See infra text accompanying notes 9-28. The term "nonrenewal" is defined in the
PMPA as:
a failure to reinstate, continue, or extend the franchise relationship
(A) at the conclusion of the term, or on the expiration date, stated in the relevant
franchise;
(B) at any time, in the case of the relevant franchise which does not state a term
of duration or an expiration date; or
(C) following a termination (on or after June 19, 1978) of the rel'!vant franchise
which was entered into prior to June 19, 1978, and has not been renewed
after such date.
15 U.S.C. § 2801(14) (1982). The PMPA defines "termination" only as including "cancel
lation." 15 U.S.C. § 2801(17) (1982).
.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I) (1982).
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dard'in defining "bona fide,"4 while others have employed a subjective
standard. 5 Section III provides an analysis of the term "bona fide,"
both in a literal sense and within various statutory contexts. Finally,
this note proposes that an objective standard of interpretation of
"bona fide" is compelled both by the literal meaning of the statute and
by its legislative history.
I.

BACKGROUND

Franchising has been called the " 'last frontier' of the independ
ent businessman."6 It presents the small-time entrepreneur with the
opportunity to invest his or her savings, time, and energy into the es
tablishment and formation of a business, while the franchisor benefits
by expanding its industry and avoiding large capital investments. 7
Ideally, franchising represents a compromise between big business and
the small, independent businessman, with the franchisor "assuming
the economic functions of big business and the franchisee contributing
entrepreneurship[] by making a capital investment and becoming an
owner-manager." 8
The petroleum marketing industry is one of the oldest franchising
industries in this country, originating before World War IJ.9 Typi
cally, the strategy of the major oil companies has been to acquire suita
ble property, construct a gasoline station, and lease. premises to a
franchisee who agrees to market the products and to use the trade
mark of the major oil company. 10 In the petroleum franchise relation
ship, the franchisor is landlord, supplier, and grantor of the trademark
license to the franchisee; the franchisee is tenant and distributor. I I
The relationship between petroleum franchisor and franchisee is
4. See infra notes 43-74 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
6. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING, at v (1969) [hereinafter H.
BROWN, FRANCHISING]. In this book, the author presents an overview of the potential
pitfalls involved in undertaking a franchise operation.
7. old. at 3.
8. Id.
9. Fels, The Franchising Phenomenon: An Overview, in THE FRANCHISING PHENOM
ENON 1 (J. Rice ed. 1969).
10. Haberthur, Petroleum Marketing Practices Act: Equalizing the Bargaining Power
in the Franchise Relationship, 25 S.D.L. REV. 69,69 (1980). This note explores the back
ground and operation of the PMPA, discusses judicial interpretation of the PMPA, and
examines early cases that arose under the Act.
11. S. REP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 873, 875 [hereinafter S. REP.].
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complex and historically has been fraught with competing interests. 12
Abuses within the franchise relationship have been numerous: unrea
sonable conditions imposed by the franchisor; inequality of bargaining
power between the parties, resulting in a relationship dictated by the
franchisor; arbitrary and discriminatory terminations of the franchise;
and threats of potential termination in order to compel compliance
with the franchisor's policies. 13 Harold Brown, a leading scholar in
the field of franchising law, noted that "[i]t is generally conceded that
the gasoline station situation is almost hopeless and offers a prime ex
ample of the worst abuses in franchising."14
Prior to the enactment of the PMP A, courts interpreted the
franchise relationship in the petroleum marketing industry based on
the tenets of contract law. 15 However, courts enforcing franchise con
tracts failed to take into account the gross disparity of bargaining
power between major oil companies and small-time franchisees. 16 The
legislative history of the PMPA reflects the problem of inequality of
bargaining power between the franchisor and franchisee:
Central to the problems faced by franchisees in this regard is the
disparity of bargaining power which exists between the franchisor
and the franchisee. This disparity results in franchise agreements
12. Id. The Senate Report described the competing interests which characterize the
petroleum market franchise relationship in the following passage:
The franchise relationship in the petroleum industry is unusual, in fact perhaps
unique, in that the franchisor commonly not only grants a trademark license but
often controls, and leases to the franchisee, the real estate premises used by the
franchisee. In addition the franchisor almost always is the primary, even exclu
sive, supplier of the franchisee's principal sale item: motor fuel.
Id.
13. Kleeger, Judicial Interpretation of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act: Con
flict and Diversity, 32 EMORY L.J. 273, 275-76 (1983).
14. Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REV. 650,657 (1971)
[hereinafter Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship].
15. See, e.g., Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 375 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (termi
nable at will clause held valid because parties had freedom to contract), aff'd 511 F.2d
1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Hollander v. American Oil Co., 329 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1971)
(there is no right to renew a lease unless the contract covenant is clear and unequivocal).
16. See, e.g., Russell v. Shell Oil Co., 382 F. Supp. 395 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (even if the
practice of the oil company in the past had been to establish a right to automatic renewal
unless "good cause" was found not to renew, such a policy does not imply a "good cause"
term into the contract agreement between the parties), aff'd, 497 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1974);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. ~ubenfeld, 48 A.D.2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975) (holding for the
franchisor that, in the absence of a statute, it is not compelled to renew a lease beyond the
contract term even though the franchisee invested capital and energy in the expectation of
renewal); but see Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973) (termination
clause was voided as against public policy because of the grossly disproportionate bargain
ing power between the parties), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
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which some franchisees have argued amount to contracts of adhe
sion. The provisions of the contracts between the franchisor and
the franchisee and the permeating influence of these ~ontracts over
nearly every major aspect of the franchisee's business may translate
the original disparity of bargaining power into continuing vulnera
bility of the franchisee to the demands and actions of the
franchisor. 17

Since the relations between the two parties are essentially contractual,
remedies for contract violations or changes in circumstances often in
cluded termination of the franchise agreement. IS Because of the time,
money, and commitment he or she has invested in the business, the
expectation of the franchisee is that the franchise be a continuing one.
A remedy of termination is in direct conflict with the expectations of
the franchisee. The Senate Report, which describes the Senate Com
mittee's discussion of the PMPA prior to its passage, states that termi
nation of the franchise is essentially punitive and extreme. 19
Likewise, the prospect of nonrenewal permeates the franchise re
lationship and manifests itself as a threat by which the franchisor may
compel the franchisee to comply with its marketing practice. 20 Harold
Brown describes the pre-PMPA situation as one in which the major oil
firms, the nation's second largest industry, have their gasoline-station
dealers "in virtual bondage, hinged on the constant threat that their
short-term contracts will not be renewed unless they submit to bur
densome franchisor-imposed practices."21
The 1973-74 Arab oil embargo and resulting energy crisis
17. S. REP., supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS at 876. Harold Brown describes this disparity in the following passage:
There is a marked, intentional, and constantly emphasized disparity in the posi
tions of the parties-the franchisor combining the roles of father, teacher, and
drill sergeant, with the franchisee, relegated to those of son, pupil, and buck
private, respectively. At the core of the franchise relationship is the contractual
control exercised by the franchisor over every aspect of the franchisee's business.
H. BROWN, FRANCHISING, supra note 6, at 41.
18. The Senate Report noted that "[t]he disparity of bargaining power which disad
vantages the franchisee in negotiations leading to execution of the franchise agreement
manifests itself in the contractually provided remedies for contract violations or changes in
circumstances .... [T]ermination of franchise agreements during the term as a remedy for
contract violations has been repeatedly utilized." S. REP., supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 876.
19. The Senate Report stated: "Termination is an extreme remedy. It is fund amen
tally punitive and not compensatory in nature, i.e., the franchisor is not compensated for
any financial injury experienced by reason of the franchisee's contractual violations. In
stead the franchisee is punished through contract termination." Id.
20. Id. at 18, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 877.
21. Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 14, at 655.

1989]

THE PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT

393

changed the nature of petroleum marketing. 22 Due to the increase in
the price of gasoline, the consumer became more interested in price
than in the brand of gasoline which he or she purchased. 23 Moreover,
due to the general tightening of the supply of oil as well as increased
supply costs, the major oil companies looked for more economical dis
tribution methods. 24 They found that, by terminating franchises and
boosting the number of salaried (i.e., company-owned and operated)
retail outlets, they could operate more economically.25 The Depart
ment of Energy received numerous complaints that franchisors were
terminating or not renewing franchises for "arbitrary and even dis
criminatory" reasons. 26 Terminations were based upon hypertechni
cal, insignificant, or unreasonable provisions of the franchise
agreement. 27 Thus, the franchisee, with the expectation that the
franchise relationship would be a continuing one, was in the position
of having invested money and time into building his or her business
and clientele only to have it terminated or not renewed by the oil
company.
The PMPA was passed in 1978 in an attempt·to equalize the bar
gaining positions of franchisees and franchisors in the petroleum in
dustry.28 Congress intended that "[a]n essential requirement of
Federal legislation is that the grounds for termination and nonrenewal
... not be so broad as to deny franchisees meaningful protections from
arbitrary or discriminatory terminations and non:-renewals or to pre
vent fulfillment of the reasonable renewal expectations of franchis
22. Using the supply of petroleum as a political weapon, the Arab nations instigated
an oil embargo against the United States which resulted in a 10-17% reduction in oil sup
plies. The effect was a significant increase in the price of petroleum and petroleum prod
ucts, which precipitated gasoline rationing plans. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 30, col.
5; N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1974, at 1, col. 7.
23. Even after the Arab oil embargo was lifted, the price of gasoline remained signifi
cantly higher than it had been before the embargo. See generally N.Y. Times, Mar. 15,
1974, at 1, col. 6.
24. Haberthur, supra note 10, at 70.
25. W. Fox, FEDERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY 367-68 (1983).
26. S. REP., supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS at 875-76.
27. Kleeger, supra note 13, at 277. See, e.g., William C. Comitius, Inc. v. Wheeler,
276 Or. 747, 556 P.2d 666 (1976). In Cornitius, the franchisee was offered a renewal lease
at a rate significantly higher than that being charged other dealers similarly situated. Id. at
749-50, 556 P.2d at 667. The court held that the service station lease was not unconsciona
ble because of the absence of a provision requiring the lessor to renew on reasonable terms.
Id. at 747, 556 P.2d at 666.
28. S. REP., supra note 11, at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS at 877.
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ees."29 Congress also remained aware of the needs of the franchisor,
recognizing that certain actions of the franchisee, such as failure to
comply with contractual obligations or certain changes in circum
stances,30 would evoke the franchisor's legitimate need to terminate
the franchise relationship.31
The PMPA provides that a franchisor engaged in the sale, con
signment, or distribution of motor fuel in commerce may not termi
nate 32 or fail to renew 33 the franchise agreement, except as specifically
29. Id.
30. The PMPA specifies examples of "events" which would render the franchisor's
termination of the franchise relationship reasonable: fraud or criminal misconduct by the
franchisee relevant to the operation of the marketing premises, bankruptcy or insolvency of
the franchisee, severe physical or mental disability of the franchisee, loss of the franchisor's
right to possession of the premises through the expiration of an underlying lease, condem
nation of the premises, loss of the franchisor's right to the trademark, destruction of all or
of a substantial part of the premises, failure of the franchisee to pay the franchisor sums due
to him in a timely manner, failure of the franchisee to operate the premises for an unreason
able period of time, wilful trademark violation by the franchisee, knowing violation by the
franchisee of laws or regulations regarding the franchise, or conviction of the franchisee of
a felony involving moral turpitude. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(c) (1982).
31. S. REP., supra note 11, at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS at 877.
32. Section 2802(b)(2) of the PMPA sets forth the following preconditions and
grounds for termination or nonrenewal of a franchise relationship:
(A) A failure by the franchisee to comply with any provision of the franchise,
which provision is both reasonable and of material significance to the
franchise relationship, if the franchisor first acquired actual or constructive
knowledge of such failure ....
(B) A failure by the franchisee to exert good faith efforts to carry out the provi
sions of the franchise . . . .
(C) The occurrence of an event which is relevant to the franchise relationship
and as a result of which termination of the franchise or nonrenewal of the
franchise relationship is reasonable, if such event occurs during the period
the franchise is in effect and the franchisor first acquired actual or construc
tive knowledge of such occurrence ....
(D) An agreement, in writing, between the franchisor and the franchisee to ter
minate the franchise or not to renew the franchise relationship ....
(E) [A] determination made by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal
course of business to withdraw from the marketing of motor fuel through
retail outlets in the relevant geographic market area in which the marketing
premises are located, if
.
(i) such determination
(I) was made after the date such franchise was entered into or rel1ewed,
and
(II) was based upon the occurrence of changes in relevant facts and cir
cumstances after such date;
.
(ii) the termination or nonrenewal is not for the purpose of converting the
premises, which are the subject of the franchise, to operation by employ
ees or agents of the franchisor for such franchisor's own account ....
15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2) (1982).
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provided by the PMPA or the franchise agreement. One reason which
the PMPA allows for nonrenewal is economic infeasibility. 34 If a de
33. Section 2802(b)(3) of the PMPA sets forth the following grounds for the nonre
newal of a franchise relationship:
(A) The failure of the franchisor and the franchisee to agree to changes or addi
tions to the provisions of the franchise . . . .
(B) The receipt of numerous bona fide customer complaints by the franchisor
concerning the franchisee's operation of the marketing premises ....
(C) A failure by the franchisee to operate the marketing premises in a clean, safe,
and healthful manner . . . .
(D) [A] determination made by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal
course of business, if
(i) such determination is
(I) to convert the leased marketing premises to a use other than the
sale or distribution of motor fuel,
(II) to materially alter, add to, or replace such premises,
(III) to sell such premises, or
(IV) that renewal of the franchise relationship is likely to be un
economical to the franchisor despite any reasonable changes or
reasonable additions to the provisions of the franchise which may
be acceptable to the franchisee
(ii) with respect to a determination referred to in subclause (II) or (IV),

such determination is not made for the purpose of converting the leased
marketing premises to operation by employees or agents of the
franchisor for such franchisor's own account; and
(iii) in the case of leased marketing premises such franchisor ... either
(I) made a bona fide offer to sell, transfer, or assign to the franchisee
such franchisor's interests in such premises; or
(II) if applicable, offered the franchisee a right of first refusal of at least
45-days duration of an offer, made by another, to purchase such
franchisor's interest in such premises.
15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3) (1982).
34. 15 U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV) (1982). The legislative history is copious on
this point. The statutory test regarding nonrenewal based on economic infeasibility is
whether the renewal of the franchise relationship is likely to be uneconomical, as distin
guished from unprofitable. S. REP., supra note II, at 36, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 895. Thus, profitability can be considered in a broad economic
sense. The Senate Report illustrated the distinction with the following example:
[A] franchise relationship which would return a net profit of $1.00 per year to the
franchisor might be profitable in an absolute sense. Nevertheless, considering the
investment of the franchisor in the facility, renewal of the franchise relationship
might not be economically j~stified. In addition, any evaluation of the economics
of renewal must be made in view of changes in the terms or conditions of the
franchise agreement which may be acceptable to the franchisee. Thus, the
franchisor may not claim that costs have soared, thereby rendering renewal of the
franchise relationship uneconomic, and ignore the willingness of the franchisee to

.agre"e i~ increase pay~ents which would offset those increased costs.
Id.
·Mor~ver, the evaluations of the economics of renewal may not be influenced by the
fact that operation of the premises would be more economical by employees of the
fra~chisor followin~ a non renewal. Id. The Senate Report stressed that the good faith
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termination is made by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal
course of business that the renewal of the franchise relationship is
likely to be uneconomical to him, the franchisor may decide not to
renew the franchise. 35 However, the franchisor must make a bona fide
offer to sell, transfer, or assign his interest in the leased premises to the
franchisee. 36
The "bona fide offer" of sale requirement imposed by the PMPA
is not discussed in the legislative history of the statute. However, by
including such a provision, it seems that Congress intended to benefit
the franchisee by affording him or her the opportunity to purchase the
business which he or she has worked to build. However, courts have
had difficulty in interpreting the requirement that the offer of sale be
"bona fide." The extent to which the offer must approach an objective
standard, such as the fair market value of the property, or to which it
can be considered "bona fide" based upon the SUbjective intent of the
offeror represent the contrasting interpretations courts have taken on
this issue. Section II discusses the cases which represent these con
flicting interpretations of the "bona fide offer" requirement.
II.

CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
"BONA FIDE OFFER"

This section presents the conflicting interpretations of the "bona
fide offer" requirement in section 2802 of the PMP A. In Slatky v.
Amoco Oil Co., 37 the court applied an objective standard to the term
determination not to renew based on economic infeasibility may not serve merely as a
means to facilitate the franchisor's objective of converting the premises to operation by its
own employees. Id.
35. IS U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV) (1982). The PMPA imposes the following time
requirement: the section applies if the franchise was entered into prior to June 19, 1978
(the date of passage of the Act) and the unexpired term on that date is three years or
longer; or, alternatively, if the franchise was entered into or renewed on or after June 19,
1978, and the term is three years or longer or the franchisee was offered a term of three
years or longer. 15 U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D) (1982).
36. 15 U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I) (1982). Alternatively, the franchisee can be of
fered a right of first refusal of at least 45-days duration on an offer made by another to
purchase the franchisor's interest in the premises. IS U.S.c. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(II)
(1982). See supra note 33 for the statutory text.
In addition, there are strict notification requirements in § 2804 of the PMPA which
must be met prior to termination. The franchisor must give notice to the franchisee, by
certified mail or personal delivery, of his intention, the reasons for his action, and the date
on which termination or nonrenewal will take effect as well as a copy of the summary
statement of this Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2804 (1982).
If a franchisor does not follow the statutory guidelines, § 2805 of the PMPA allows
the franchisee to bring a civil action in a federal district court. 15, U.S.C. § 2805(a) (1982).
37. 830 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1987).
'
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"bona fide." In that case, the court held that, for an offer of sale to be
"bona fide" within the meaning of the PMP A, the offer must approach
fair market value. 38 However, in two district court cases, Brownstein
v. Arco Petroleum Products CO. 39 and Kessler v. Amoco Oil CO.,40 the
courts applied a subjective standard based on the franchisor's subjec
tive belief in the fair market value of the property. In these cases, the
courts interpreted "bona fide" offer to be an offer made in conformity
with the franchisor's general practice of selling property and an offer
which the franchisor subjectively believed represented fair market
value. 41 In Kim v. Mobil Oil Corp.,42 the court devised an intermedi
ate approach which shifts the burden of proof to the franchisor to jus
tify the high price when the offer price is shown to be higher than the
fair market value.
A.

Slatky v. Amoco Oil CO.43

In Slatky, the franchisee leased a gasoline station for several years
from Amoco Oil Company (Amoco). As a result of Slatky's declining

sales revenues, Amoco decided not to renew his franchise agreement. 44
Amoco gave Slatky the requisite notice and, based on the PMPA,
made an offer of $306,300.()()45 to sell Slatky the service station, with
38. [d. at 485.
39. 604 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
40. 670 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
41. The district court in Slatky followed the Brownstein court's reasoning. See supra
notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
42. No. CV 85-4689 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 1986) (WESTLAW, OCT database).
43. 830 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1987).
44. Section 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV) of the PMPA provides a ground for nonrenewal of
a franchise relationship. If the franchisor makes a determination in good faith and in the
normal course of business that the renewal is likely to be uneconomical to him, despite any
reasonable changes to the provisions of the franchise which may be acceptable to the fran
chisee, the PMPA allows such a ground for nonrenewal. 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (b)(3)(D)(i)(IV)
(1982).
45. Amoco arrived at the $306,300.00 sale price through the following procedure.
Amoco's capital investment representative evaluated the land and appraised its value, with
out tanks, pumps, and improvements, at $155,000.00. Following the land appraisal,
Amoco's project engineer performed an appraisal of the property improvements and esti
mated the replacement cost of the improvements, including the tanks and lines, to be
$121,300.00. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 479-80.
Based on these two estimates, Amoco's real estate manager recommended a sales price
of $276,300.00 to the district manager. The district manager replied that "costs as they are
today and the improvements that we have on the property, I would believe the appraisal
would be more reasonable at $350,000, less tanks and lines." [d. at 480. Thus, while not
disagreeing with the procedures followed to arrive at the appraisal, the district manager
requested a review of the figure. A second appraisal was made of the property, and this
time the value' was determined to be $185,000.00, a figure $30,000.00 higher than the first
estimate. Amoco offered to sell Slatky the service station for $306,300.00, which included
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out the underground tanks and pumps.46
Slatky made a counter-offer of $158,200.00, including the tanks
and dispensers. Slatky had two appraisals performed, one of which
valued the property at $158,200.00, including the pumps and tanks,
and the other at $145,000.00, but not including the pumps and
tanks. 47 Amoco rejected Slatky's counter-offer. 48 .
'Slatky filed a complaint seeking damages and an injunction order
ing Amoco to sell the property to him at fair market value. Although
Slatky did not challenge .the grounds for nonrenewal, he claimed that
Amoco's offer of $306,300.00 was not a "bona fide· offer" within the
meaning of the PMPA because it was not based on the ~air' market
value of the property. An independent appraisal was yommissioned by
Amoco for the litigation, and it valued the property at $221,000.00,
not including the 'pumps and tanks. 49
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania heid
that Amoco's offer was bona fide. 50 Because the offer was made in the
ordinary course of business, employing procedures normally used for
evaluating property, and because Amoco offered the property at what
it believed was fair market value, the court held that the "bona fide
offer" requirement of the PMPA was met.5 1 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's finding and
held that Amoco's offer to sell was not bona fide because it was not
objectively reasonable. 52
$185,000.00 for the land plus $121,300.00 for the improvements, but not including the
tanks and pumps. Id.
46. Id. at 479. Courts have interpreted the "bona fide offer" requirement not to have
been met when the franchisor offered to sell only the real property of the marketing prem
ises, without the underground tanks and pumps. See Roberts v. Amoco Oil Co., 740 F.2d
602 (8th Cir. 1984); Greco v. Mobil Oil Corp., 597 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See infra
notes 178-182. But see Tobias v. Shell Oil Co., 782.F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1986). See infra
note 182.
47. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 480.
48. In a letter dated August 26, 1985, after Slatky filed his complaint, Amoco stated
that the exclusion of the tanks and pumps was mistaken and offered Slatky the property for
$306,300.00-$256,300.00 plus $50,000.00 for the tanks and pumps, or $306,300.00 total.
Id.
49. Id.
50. Slatky v. Amoco Oil Co., 626 F. Supp. 1223 (M.D. Pa. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 476
(3d Cir. 1987).
51. Id. at 1227. The district court's reasoning was based on the contention that, if
Congress intended for sales to be made at fair market value, it would have used the words
"fair market value," rather than "bona fide" in the language of the PMPA. Id. Moreover;
the court concluded that Slatky was properly in possession of the premises based upon the
stipulation agreement, so Amoco was not entitled to damages. Further, the court noted
that an award of damages would be inconsistent with the PMPA. Id.
52. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 486.
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On appeal, Amoco's principle contention was that the term "bona
fide" should be interpreted to require only that a franchisor's offer be
made in subjective good faith. 53 Amoco analogized the "bona fide"
requirement of the offer price to the statutory requirement imposed by
the PMPA that a franchisor's determination not to renew a franchise
because of a business reason be made in "good faith and in the normal
course ofbusiness."54 Amoco contended that the legislative history of
the PMPA suggests that Congress sought to avoid judicial scrutiny of
a business decision. 55 Therefore, the offer price, like the determination
not to renew, was a business decision, which should not be second
guessed by a court. 56
The court of appeals rejected Amoco's analogy. The court dis
agreed with the basic analogy that a business decision not to renew is
similar to an offer for sale. 57 The court reasoned that the purpose of
the good faith standard as applied to nonrenewal is to allow
franchisors flexibility to respond to changing market conditions. 58 In
contrast, because the offer price is circumscribed by the PMPA, its
determination is not an autonomous "business decision." The court
stated that the determination of the offer price "is not a decision that
the distributor decides on its own to make. Rather, the distributor sets
a bona fide price only because the statute requires it to do SO."59 The
court characterized such a decision as a "compliance judgment" or a
"judgment about how best to protect the company's interests while
complying with the statute. Congress did not instruct the courts to
53.

Id. at 480.
54. Id. at 480-81.
55. The Senate Report stated:
These tests provide adequate protection of franchisees from arbitrary or discrimi
natory termination or non-renewal, yet avoid judicial scrutiny of the business
judgment itself. Thus, it is not necessary for the court to determine whether a
particular marketing strategy, such as a market withdrawal, or the conversion of
leased marketing premises to a use other than the sale or distribution of motor
fuel, is a wise business decision.
S. REP., supra note 11, at 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 896.
56. Statky, 830 F.2d at 481.
57. Id. The court furtper suggested that to allow the analogy between the nonre
newal decision and the offer price decision would confuse procedural restrictions with sub
stantive ones. The "good faith and normal course of business" requirement imposed by the
statute on the decision not to renew is a procedural direction for the court to use in deter
mining whether the franchisor abided by the substantive provisions of the Act. To apply
this procedural direction to a determination of offer price turns it into a substantive restric
tion on the franchisor's behavior. Id. at 482.
58. Id. at 481.
59. Id.
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defer to such decisions."60
The court suggested a hypothetical situation in which the
franchisor fails to renew the franchisee's contract because it plans to
convert the property to a different use or to alter the premises. If the
franchisor were required to sell the property to the franchisee, the
franchisor's own plans for the property would be defeated. 61 In such a
situation, the franchisor's interest in retaining the property would best
be served by setting an unreasonably high sale price for the premises
which the franchisee could not meet. The court concluded that the
PMPA should not be read to allow deference both to the business mer
its of the franchisor's judgment and to its own sense of fairness of its
offer price. 62
Having rejected Amoco's sUbjective "bona fide offer" standard,
the court of appeals devised a two-step approach to determine whether
a franchisor has met the "bona fide offer" requirement of the PMP A.
First, a court must determine if a franchisor sUbjectively believed its
offer represented the fair market value. 63 Secondly, a court must de
termine whether the offer was objectively reasonable, that is, whether
the offer did, in fact, approach fair market value. 64 The court defined
"fair market value" as "the highest price a willing buyer would pay."65
The court contended that the PMPA requires the franchisor to make
an offer as if it "actually" wanted to sell the property, "not necessarily
to the franchisee but to someone."66
While the first part of Slatky's two-part test relied on the subjec
tive intent of the franchisor, the court reasoned that this step was nec
essary. There may be relevant factors other than sincere belief and
objective reasonableness as essential elements in the determination of
the bona fides of an offer. For example, an offer approaching fair mar
ket value might include additional unreasonable conditions of sale. 67
The second part of the test lays out an objective standard: whether the
offer approached the fair market value of the property. In most cases,
the second part of the test would effectively subsume the first and
would probably result in a single-tier objective standard.
In arriving at its two-step approach, the court concluded that the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 485 n.7.
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purpose of the PMPA was to protect the franchisee's reasonable ex
pectation of a continuing franchise relationship.68 The "bona fide of
fer" provision prevents the franchisor from setting a high price to
compensate it for the loss of its future business plans with the premises
and further prevents the franchisor from setting an even higher price if
it thought the franchisee would pay it because of the commitment he
or she has made to the property. The court stated:
The special desire of a franchisee to maintain the property with
which he has worked is exactly what produces the distributor's gen
eral bargaining advantage. Either price, a price reflecting the dis
tributor's desire to pursue its business plans or a price reflecting the
franchisor's special commitment to the property, might fail to com
pensate the franchisee for the loss of his reasonable expectation of
renewal. 69

Thus, the court posited that its two-step approach would protect the
franchisee's reasonable expectations that the franchise relationship
would be a continuing one. 70
Because the district court had only determined that the property
was offered to the franchisee at what the franchisor believed to be fair
market value, the court of appeals remanded the case for further fact
findings to determine that the offer price was objectively reasonable.7 1
The court noted that Slatky had presented substantial evidence of in
dependent appraisals demonstrating that Amoco's estimate was con
siderably high.72 Further, the court stated that the mere following of
68.

Id. at 484.
69. Id.
70. In Slatky, the dissent stated that the PMPA p'uts the good faith of the franchisor
at issue, not the fair market value of the property. For this reason, an independent ap
praisal can hardly be required as part of the franchisor's evidentiary burden in such a case.
The dissent, noting the balance which Congress strove to achieve with the PMPA, pointed
to the fact that the franchisor bears the burden of going forward with evidence that he has
complied with the statute. What the majority effectively requires is that the franchisor
introduce evidence that it relied upon the opinion of an independent appraiser. Slatky, 830
F.2d at 486 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
Further, the dissent contended that market value is merely a matter of opinion until
the subject property actually does change hands. The PMPA requires, at minimum, that
the franchisor follow its general practice for selling property. The dissent reviewed the
procedure by which Amoco arrived at its offer price and detennined that, because Amoco's
usual appraisal procedures were followed, the franchisor subjectively believed the offer
price to be fair. The franchisor may demonstrate its good faith by procuring an independ
ent appraisal, but nothing in the PMPA or its legislative history demands such a require
ment. Id. at 490-91.
71. Id. at 486.
72. Id.
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reasonable procedures does not guarantee a reasonable estimate. 73
The specific facts used by the appraisers in,determining the value of
the property and the inferences drawn from these facts must be evalu
ated by the court on remand in order to determine an objectively rea
sonable offer price. 74
B.

A Subjective Interpretation of "Bona Fide"

Two federal district court cases interpreted the "bona fide offer"
requirement in the PMPA to reflect the franchisor's subjective belief in
the value of the property as long as the determination of the price was
made in the normal course of business. This approach, adhered to by
the district court in Slatky was rejected on appeal by the Third Circuit
in Slatky v. Amoco. 75
1.

Brownstein v. Arco Petroleum Products Co.76

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania interpreted the "bona fide
offer" requirement a year before Slatky in a factually similar case. In
Brownstein, Arco Petroleum Products Co. (Arco) made an offer to sell
the service station to the franchisee, Brownstein, at a price that was
16% over that estimated by the franchisee's appraisers. 77 The fran
chisee's two appraisal figures were $190,000.00 and $192,000.00 re
spectively.78 Arco hired an appraiser who appraised the property at
$250,000.00, and Arco set the offer price at $290,000.00. 79 An inter
nal Arco worksheet noted that the asking price was well over fair mar
ket value. 80 Ar~o argued that nothing in its policy required it to offer
the property at fair market value, nor did the PMPA compel that the
73. Id. at 485.
74. Id.
75. 830 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1987).
76. 604 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The decision by the court of appeals in Statky
effectively overruled Brownstein. However, it is included here because it first established
the subjective standard which was relied upon by the district court decisions in Slatky v.
Amoco Oil Co., 626 F. Supp. 1223 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Kessler v. Amoco Oil Co., 670 F.
Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1987); and Tobias v. Shell Oil Co., 782 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1986).
77. Brownstein, 604 F. Supp. at 316.
78. Id. at 313. Brownstein's first appraiser I!sed a market approach in which he
compared the premises to eight other service stations in northeast Pennsylvania that were
sold in the preceding nineteen months. Id. Brownstein's second appraiser used the cost
approach, whereby he estimated the value of the land by comparing it to five unimproved
parcels that had been sold in recent months, adding to that figure the depreciated reproduc
tion costs of the building, the equipment, and the site improvements. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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offer price be the fair market value of the property.8l
In Brownstein, the court devised a two-fold test to determine
whether an _offer is "bona fide" within the meaning of the PMPA.
First, the franchisor must demonstrate that the offer was made in con
formity with its general practice of selling property.82 Second, even if
the franchisor is able to demonstrate that the offer was made in con
formity with its general practices, the offer must also "meet or very
nearly approach what the offeror believes to be the fair market value of
the property."83
In this case, the court determined that Arco had not satisfied even
the first hurdle: a demonstration "at the very least that the offer was
made in conformity with the offeror's general practice for selling prop~
erty."84 The court found that Arco had not demonstrated how or why
it had adjusted the figure submitted by its appraiser or how such an
adjustment was consistent with Arco's general practices. 85 The court,
thus, could not conclude that the offer was bona fide. The court rea
soned that, in passing the PMPA, Congress had not intended, that a
franchisor be able to by-pass the PMPA's elaborate mechanism by
simply setting a price substantially in excess of what it believed to be
the fair market value. 86
2.

Kessler v. Amoco Oil Co.

The same two-fold sUbjective standard was set out in Kessler v.
Amoco Oil CO.87 (Amoco), but, because it is factually different, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant oil com
pany. In Kessler, a franchisee brought an action against Amoco when
it elected not to renew the service station lease. The franchisee con
tended that Amoco's offer to sell was not "bona fide" because the offer
price differed from the fair market value. 88
As evidence of the fair market value of the premises, Kessler
presented an offer price made to Amoco by a third party, Gilco Con
Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 315.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
85. Id. at 316.
86. Id. at 315-16.
87. 670 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
88. Id. at 860. The franchisee also claimed that Amoco violated the PMPA on two
other grounds. Kessler challenged the nonrenewal of the franchise because he claimed that
the notice was deficient and that the decision not to renew was lacking in good faith. Id. at
856. On both of these grounds, the court held that the franchisor had fulfilled the requisite
PMPA precepts. Id. at 856-58.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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struction Company (Gilco). The offer by Gilco was for $750,000.00,
with an option to take only the land or the land and improvements. 89
Based on Gilco's offer, the Amoco representative recommended that
the fair market value of the land alone was $750,000.00, to which the
improvements' value should be added. 90 Amoco made an offer to
Kessler, as required by the PMPA, for $951,157.00. Gilco then in
creased its offer to $1,050,000.00. 91
Kessler argued that Gilco's initial offer of $750,000.00 and the
appraisal by Amoco's representative, which indicated that the fair
market value of the land alone was $750,000.00, were both evidence
that the fair market value of the property was, in fact, $750,000.00.
He further argued that Amoco's offer to him of $951,157.00 was not
bona fide within the meaning of the PMPA because it was in excess of
the fair market value. 92
In granting Amoco's motion for summary judgment, the court
interpreted the phrase "bona fide" in the PMPA to mean that the
franchisor determine the value of the property within the normal
course of business and that the offer price reflect the franchisor's sub
jective belief as to the value of the property.93 The court reasoned that
an objective standard "would make a court the arbiter between differ
ent' appraisal figures and methods, would require an open ended in
quiry by the court into the business practices of franchisors in
assessing the value of property they wish to sell," and would upset the
delicate balance sought by Congress between the protection of fran
chisees and the interests of franchisors. 94 The court concluded that
Kessler's assumptions that Amoco would have accepted Gilco's initial
offer of $750,000.00 and that Gilco would have opted to take the im
provements were not shown to be true. 95 Differences of opinion as to
the value of property alone, reckoned the court, are "insufficient to
raise a triable issue of fact, because they do not serve to controvert
89. Id. at 855. If Gilco purchased only the land, Amoco would be responsible for
removing the improvements. But, in either case, Amoco was to pay a $75,000.00 commis
sion on the sale, if completed. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 856.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 860. See Kim v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. CV 85-4689, slip op. at 30-31 (C.D.
Cal. July 16, 1986).
94. Kessler at 860. The court in Kessler relied heavily on the district court's holding
in Slatky. The Kessler court stated that "Slatky holds that 'the offer must approach what
the offeror believes is the fair market value. It does not follow, however, that defendant's
offer must approach the fair market value as determined by plaintiff's appraisers.'" Id.
(quoting Slatky, 626 F. Supp. at 1227).
95. Id.
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Amoco's affidavits demonstrating its sUbjective interpretation of the
Gilco offer."96
Thus, Brownstein and Kessler apply a similar subjective standard
for determining the bona fides of an offer price. However, one federal
district court case, Kim v. Mobil Oil Corp., 97 reflects an intermediate
position between the Slatky objective standard and the Brownstein and
Kessler sUbjective standard.
C.

Kim v. Mobil Oil COrp.98

In Kim, Mobil offered to sell the leased gasoline station to fran
chisee, Kim, at a price of $717,922.00 for the real property and
$17,422.00 for the personal property.99 Mobil's senior real estate rep
resentative, who submitted this figure, testified that he believed at the
time that the fair market value of the property was actually
$750,000.00. 100 However, a second appraisal made by Mobil valued
the property at $420,000.00, WI and an appraisal obtained by the fran
chisee determined the fair market value of the station to be
$525,000.00. \02 Mobil justified its high offer price figure based on the
following factors: the appreciation of the property since the original
appraisal, discussions with three local real estate brokers, the quality
of the comparable properties, the quality of the subject matter prop
erty, scarcity of similar properties, and the current value trend in this
area. 103
In Kim, the court determined that when a franchisee makes a
prima facie case that the offer was not bona fide by showing that the
offer price was above the fair market value as assessed by appraisers,
whether hired by the franchisee or franchisor, the burden of proving
the bona fides of the offer shifts to the franchisor. I04 The franchisor
must describe its procedures for arriving at its offer price, list the crite
ria it used, demonstrate that those procedures and criteria were ap
96.

Id. at 86l.

97.

No. CV 85-4689 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 1986) (WESTLAW, DCT database).

98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 34. The burden of producing evidence on an issue, in general, is born by

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
the first party who has pled the existence of the fact. Usually the plaintiff bears the burden
of producing evidence on an issue because it is he/she who seeks to change the present state
of affairs and who should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof. E. CLEARY,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 947, § 337, at 950-51 (1984).
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plied in the instant case, and, moreover, articulate its reasons for
raising the offer price above fair market value. 105 The burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact that the
franchisor did not follow its usual procedure or that its stated reasons
for raising the offer price were pretextual or otherwise not
legitimate. 106
In this case, the court found that the franchisee, Kim, had pro
duced evidence that Mobil's offer price was higher than the fair mar
ket value assessed by Kim's appraisers as well as appraisers hired by
Mobil. 107 However, in response, Mobil produced evidence that the of
fer price was determined through its regular procedures and that its
regular criteria were used regarding the leased property. Further
more, Mobil had thoroughly articulated the reasons why the offer
price was higher than the appraised values. lOB The court, therefore,
concluded that the price it offered franchisee, Kim, was "bona fide"
under the PMP A.

,III.

ANALYSIS OF "BONA FIDE OFFER" IN THE

PMPA

In Slatky, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreted
"bona fide" to require that an offer be objectively reasonable. The
court correctly founded its analysis on both the contextual meaning of
the words of the statute and on the legislative intent. Section A ana
lyzes the meaning of the term "bona fide," in terms of its plain mean
ing and within various contexts. The court in Brownstein, in devising
its SUbjective standard, looked only to the plain meaning of "bona
fide." The court in Kessler and the district court in Slatky followed
the subjective standard set out in Brownstein. However, the court of
appeals in Slatky examined the contextual meaning of "bona fide" as
well. Section B analyzes the legislative intent of the statute. In pass
ing the PMPA, Congress sought both to protect the franchisee's ex
105. Kim, No. CV 85-4689 at 34.
106. Id. The law of corporations employs a procedure of shifting the burden of proof
in cases similar to the franchise cases presented here. In a conflict of interest transaction, if
the plaintiff can prove that an interested director entered into a transaction which proved to
be unfair to the corporation, the court shifts the burden of proof to the defendant director
to show the intrinsic fairness of the transaction. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218
(Del. 1976). While these franchise cases do not involve interested directors, they are simi
lar to the conflict of interest cases involving directors of corporations. These cases repre
sent an interested party, i.e., the franchisor who may wish to retain the property, and who,
it is argued, is in a fiduciary relationship with the franchisee. Thus, the Kim court's shifting
the burden of proof to the interested party has precedent in the law of corporations.
107. Kim, No. CV 85-4689 at 35.
108. Id.
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pectations that the franchise be on-going and to equalize the disparate
bargaining power between the franchisee and franchisor. In both anal
yses, it is urged that the term "bona fide" be determined by a court
based on objective criteria, the standard established by the court of
appeals in Slatky.
A.

Literal Interpretation
1.

The Plain Meaning Rule

Statutory interpretation has traditionally looked first to the plain
meaning of the words of the statute in seeking to find a clear and un
ambiguous meaning. 109 The leading treatise on statutory interpreta
tion notes that "courts are bound to give effect to the literal meaning
without consulting other indicia of intent or meaning when the mean
ing of the statutory text itself is 'plain' or 'clear and unambiguous.'llo
However, 'whether . . . the words of a statute are clear is itself not
always clear,' "111 and "[t]he fact that a statute has been interpreted
differently by different courts has been cited as evidence that the stat
ute is ambiguous and unclear."112 In interpreting the term "bona
fide" within the meaning of the PMPA, the fact that courts have de
vised three conflicting interpretations indicates that the literal words
of the statute taken alone are unclear and that the plain meaning rule
is inadequate in deducing the proper interpretation of "bona fide."
In its determination that a "bona fide" offer "must meet or very
nearly approach what the offeror believes to be the fair market value of
the property,"l13 the district court in Brownstein relied only on the
literal, plain meaning of "bona fide."1l4 The court in Brownstein
quoted the following definition of "bona fide" from Black's Law Dic
tionary: "In or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; with
out deceit or fraud .... Real, actual, genuine, and not feigned."1l5
109. Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917). In the seminal case on what has come
to be known as the "plain meaning rule," Justice Day declared that "[w]here the language
is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise
and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." Id. at 485.
110. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04, at 86 (4th
ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
.
111. Id. (quoting Barbe ·v. United States, 392 F.2d 532, 535 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968».
112. Id. at 86.
113. Brownstein, 604 F. Supp. at 315.
114. Id. Likewise, the district court in Kessler and the district court in Slatky pres
ent similar arguments. Kessler, 670 F. Supp. at 860; Slatky, 626 F. Supp. at ~226.
115. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 160-61 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis
added».
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Literally, "bona fide" is a Latin ablative meaning "in good faith."II6
The meaning of the term "bona fide" cannot be ascertained by a
canvass of its definitions alone, as the court in Brownstein at
tempted. II7 While an element of subjective motivation and intent of
the actor is implied within these literal dictionary definitions, single
. words have little meaning when taken out of the context in which they
are used. Hart and Sacks in "Statutory Interpretation" urge that "[i]n
deciding whether words will bear a particular meaning, a court needs
to be linguistically wise and not naive. It needs to understand, espe
cially, that meaning depends upon context."118 The court in Brown
stein, which relied solely on the dictionary definition of "bona fide," 119
failed to make this necessary step from the plain meaning of the term
"bona fide" to an inquiry into its contextual meaning. While the term
"bona fide" defined alone may imply an dement of subjectivity, the
. context within which it is used is generally more supportive of an in
terpretation based on objective criteria.
In attempting to ascertain a SUbjective or objective approach to
the term' "bona fide," the plain meaning alone is inadequate and fur
ther investigations into the contextual meaning of "bona fide" are nec
essary. The next section explores various statutory contexts in which
"bona fide" is used, and it examines judicial interpretations which
have consistently rendered an objective interpretation.
2.

Contextual Analysis of "Bona Fide"

In many different contexts, an objective standard is used as an
interpretive yardstick to measure the bona fides of the noun qualified
as "bona fide." 120 The courts in Brownstein, Kessler, and Kim failed to
116. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 61 (1965). The
district court in Slatky and the court in Kim based their analyses upon the plain meaning
approach enunciated in Brownstein. The court in Kessler based its reasoning upon the
district court in Slatky and on Kim.
117. Brownstein, 604 F. Supp. at 315.
118. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process (1958) (unpublished manuscript).
119. Brownstein, 604 F. Supp. at 315.
120. Perhaps the most common legal usage of "bona fide" is in the context of bona
fide purchaser in the common law of property. A bona fide purchaser is one who has
purchased property for valuable consideration without any notice of a defect in the title of
the seller. Before assigning the legally-protected status of bona fide purchaser, the law re
quires a subjective inquiry into the state of mind of the purchaser and the objective stan
dards of constructive and real notice. R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.10
(1984).
Notice can be acquired in any of three ways. First, there can be actual notice of the
seller's defective title, in which case an inquiry is made into the subjective state of the
purchaser's mind. If the purchaser knew of a defect in the seller's title, he is denied status
as a bona fide purchaser under the law, and title to the property remains with the other

THE PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT

1989]

409

make this inquiry into the contextual meaning of "bona fide."
In Slatky, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit inquired
into the contextual meaning of the term. The court found that, while
the purposes and intentions of the actor may be relevant, to determine
the bona fides of each noun, objectively verifiable characteristics must
be examined. 121 The Slatky court listed several statutory categories
required to be "bona fide": "'bona fide student,' "122 a " 'bona fide
parent-child relationship,' "123 a " 'bona fide member of the crew' "124
of a vessel, and employees of a " 'bona fide United States incorporated
nonprofit organization.' "125 All of these statutory categories are de
termined by courts based on objective criteria. 126
Three statutory contexts are presented below in which the term
"good faith" is analyzed. The term "good faith" has the same literal
definition as "bona fide."127 In each context, courts have used objec
tive criteria as a standard to determine the status of each category. In
interpreting the "bona fide offer" requirement of the PMPA, courts
should be guided by these comparable statutory contexts.
First, similar to the PMPA is the Au~omobile Dealers Day in
Court Act. 128 The Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act was passed
by Congress to protect automobile franchisees by imposing statutory
requirements of good faith upon their relationship with the automobile
manufacturers. The Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act defines
"good faith" as a duty to "act in a fair and equitable manner toward
each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion,
intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other
party. Second, notice can be constructive and, thus, imputed to the purchaser-if a visual
inspection of the property or interrogation of those in possession of the property indicate
that the seller has defective title. Third, information found in public records is always
imputed to the purchaser as constructive notice. Id.
The second and third ways in which notice can be acquired are based on objective
standards. If there are objective, external realities to indicate that the seller of the property
does not have good title, the law imposes a duty to inquire upon the bona fide purchaser. If
he fails to make this inquiry, he is deemed to have had constructive notice, and he loses his
bona fide purchaser status. Id.
121. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 483.
122. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (1982)).
123. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(I)(D) (1982)).
124. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.c. § 1287 (1982)).
125. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1430(c) (1982)).

126.

Id.

127. "Bona fide" is the Latin translation of "good faith," which is defined as "in
accordance with standards of honesty, trust, sincerity." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 822 (S. F1exner, ed. 1987).
128. 15 U.S.c. § 1222 (1982).
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party."129 This "good faith" requirement is determined by courts
within the context of coercion or intimidation of the franchisee by the
motor company.13o Courts analyze objective criteria----evidence of co
ercion or intimidation-in making the determination of "good
faith,"131 considering even the propriety or reasonableness of the con
tract itself. 132
A similar "good faith" requirement is imposed in Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code. \33 In determining whether a: debtor's plan of
less than full repayment to unsecured creditors should be con
firmed,134 several courts hold that the debtor's situation and other cir
cumstances should be considered by the court, \35 and several hold that
the determination should be made based solely on the amount of the
repayment. 136 In either case, objective criteria-the debtor's circum- .
stances or the factual amount of repayment-are used iIi the
determination.
Finally, "the term 'good faith' is specifically set forth in approxi
mately 50 of the 400 sections of the Uniform Commercial Code
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1982). Moreover, the Automobile Dealers Day in Court
Act notes that "recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument
shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith." Id.
130. See Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 433 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1970); Southern
Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967),cert. denied,
389 U.S. 832 (1967); Cecil Corley Motor Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp.
819 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Blenke Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ind.
1962); Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
131. See, e.g., Zebelman v. Chrysler Corp., 299 F. Supp. 653, 658 (E.D. Mo. 1968)
(holding that the "good faith" requirement imposed by the Act on the termination of the
franchise agreement be actually based on evidence of poor performance rather than on
some ulterior motive of the manufacturer).
132. Annotation, Good Faith-Automobile Dealer, 50 A.L.R. FED. 246, 247 (1980).
133. 11 U.S.c. § 1325(a)(3) (1982).
134. Section 1325(a) states, "The court shaH confirm a plan if- ... (3) the plan has
been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law." Id.
135. See Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982). In Deans, the court
enumerated the following factors relevant in the determination of good faith: the percent
age of the proposed repayment to unsecured creditors; the debtor's financial situation; the
period of time payment will be made; the debtor's employment history and prospects; the
nature and amount of unsecured claims; the debtor's past bankruptcy failings; and any
unusual or exceptional problems facing the particular debtor.' The only subjective factor a
court should consider is the debtor's honesty in representing facts. Id. at 972. Therefore,
the court in Deans used almost exclusively objective criteria in its intt:rpret~tion. of !'good
faith." See also In Re Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982); In Re' Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th
Cir. 1982); In Re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982).
136. See In Re Lambert, 10 Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 223 (1981); In Re Levine, 10 Bankr.
D. Mass. 168 (1981); In Re Murallo, 4 Bankr. D. Conn. 666 (1980).
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(U.C.C.)."137 The Official Comment to section 2-209 of the U.C.C.
provides that when merchants are seeking a modification of their con
tract agreement, the test of "good faith" includes" 'observance of rea
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade' ... and may
in some situations require an objectively demonstrable reason for seek
ing a modification." 138 Ernest Gellhorn notes that this sense of the
term "good faith" has nothing to do with the state of mind of the
actor, but relates to the fairness or reasonableness of the
performance. 139
Thus, in the statutory contexts of the Automobile Dealers Day in
Court Act, the Bankruptcy Code, and the Uniform Commercial Code
courts have interpreted "good faith" based exclusively upon objective
criteria. Courts' interpretation of the "bona fide offer" requirement of
the PMPA can be guided by these similar contextual analyses. "Bona
fide" is also used in a different section of the PMPA in the context of
the receipt of "bona fide customer complaints" as a ground for the
nonrenewal of a franchise relationship.l40 An analysis of the judicial
interpretations of this section of the PMPA is instructive in defining a
contextual interpretation of "bona fide." 141
In Robertson v. Mobil,142 the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir
137. Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Right~Franchise Cancella
tions, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 470 n.17 (1967).
138. V.e.e. § 2-209 Comment (1977).
139. Gellhorn, supra note 137, at 470 n.l7. The concept of "good faith" in the
V.C.C. has traditionally been interpreted as lacking "positive meaning" or as "the absence
of bad faith." This "excluder analysis" has been emphatically rejected by other scholars.
All excluder terms are parasitic upon other terms for their existence. However, in this case,
both "good faith" and "bad faith" are parasitic or "substantive-hungry." Thus, the "ex
cluder analysis" fails because "there must be some concept (a substantive) upon which
good faith is parasitic." Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith
Performance and Enforcement Under Anicle Nine, 137 V. PA. L. REV. 335, 346-49 (1989).
140. Section 2802(b)(3) of the PMPA provides:
[flor purposes of this sub-section, the following are grounds for nonrenewal of a
franchise relationship: ... (B) The receipt of numerous bona fide customer com
plaints by the franchisor concerning the franchisee's operation of the marketing
premises, if-{i) the franchisee was promptly appraised of the existence and na
ture of sucp complaints following receipt of such complaints by the franchisor;
and (ii) if such complaints related to the condition of such premises or to the
conduct of any employee of such franchisee, the franchisee did not promptly take
action to cure or correct the basis of such complaints.
15 V.S.C. § 2802 (b)(3) (1982).
.
141. Sutherland notes that "[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sec
tions and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or sec
tion should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole." 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05,
at 90 (4th ed. 1984).
.
142. 778 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1985).
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cuit interpreted "bona fide customer complaints" based on an objec
tive standard. 143 In Robertson, the franchisee provided both a "mini
serve" gasoline island and a "full-serve" gasoline island at his Penn
sylvania station. l44 Because a "mini-serve" island usually operates at
little or no profit, dealers often increase the prices of gasoline at their
"full-serve" islands in order to offset their losses. 145 However, Robert
son raised the price at the "full-serve" island substantially.146 More
over, he advertised the price of the "mini-serve" gasoline with a large
sign, and he did not advertise the high price of the "full-serve" island
gasoline. 147 Mobil, the franchisor, received 126 customer complaints
about the substantially higher "full-serve" price and misleading adver
tising technique used by Robertson. 148
The PMPA provides that one of the grounds upon which a
franchisor may base a decision not to renew a franchise relationship is
the receipt of "numerous bona fide customer complaints by the
franchisor concerning the franchisee's operation of the marketing
premises."149 In Robertson, the court interpreted "bona fide," when
used to describe customer complaints, as "sincere and having a reason
able basis in fact."150 The "reasonable basis in fact" requirement, an
objective determination, means that the circumstance does actually ex
ist and that the franchisee can be held reasonably accountable for the
circumstance. lSI
The court of appeals in Slatky relied on Robertson's "reasonable
basis in fact" analysis. The objective criteria in Robertson were the
actual customer complaints. The court in Robertson stipulated only
that the complaints be true and pertain to matters about which the
. franchisee is culpable. Similarly, the Slatky court applied the "reason
able basis in fact" requirement to the offer price and found that it
refers to "a range of prices with reasonable claims to being fair market
143. Id. Justice Becker of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit wrote both the
Statky and Robertson opinions.
'
144. Id. at 1006.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3) (1982). See supra note 34 for the complete text of the
statute.
ISO. Robertson, 778 F.2d at 1008.
lSI. Id. The court reasoned that the receipt of numerous sincere complaints is not a
basis "for nonrenewal if the complaints are false or if they pertain to matters about which
the franchisee is not culpable." Id. In this case, however, the complaints were true, and the
franchisee was culpable. Id.
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,
value."152 The Slatky court urged courts to scrutinize the distributor's
offer in a manner similar to that set out in Robertson. The court
reasoned:
a standard of scrutiny that simply focused on whether the distribu
tor believed its offer to represent fair market value would leave the
franchisee open to injury through sloppiness or mere error. Such a
focus might also prove difficult to apply, for intentions are always
difficult to discern, especially when we deal not with the intentions
of individuals but of organizations. 153

The courts in Brownstein, Kessler, and the district court in Slatky,
however, held that if an appraisal was made employing procedures
used in the normal course of business and if the franchisor offered the
property at what it SUbjectively believed to be the fair market price,
then the offer was bona fide within the meaning of the PMPA. The
court of appeals in Slatky regarded this two-pronged test as inade
quate. The court stated that "the mere following of reasonable proce
dures ... does not necessarily result in a reasonable estimate."154
Slatky had presented evidence that the land appraisal by Amoco was
out-of-date, that the property had been compared to other sites which
were inappropriate in order to determine its value, and "that the im
provements appraisal did not represent local costS."155 A court must
focus on specific facts presented by appraisers and on the inferences
drawn from those facts. 156 What is necessary in the determination of
the bona fides of the offer is not evidence of the franchisor's usual
procedures, which may be misleading, or even deceptive, but rather
evidence of the standard of fair market value range which the property
commands. 157 The court in Slatky stated that a range of prices with
reasonable claims to being the fair market value is the appropriate
standard in determining the bona fides of the franchisor's offer.158
152. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 485.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 485-86.
157. While fair market value is often an elusive term, it has generally been taken to
mean "the amount at which a property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under compulsion to buy or sell and both being aware of all
relevant facts." Kim v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. CV 85-4689 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 1986)
(WESTLAW, DCT DATABASE) at 33.
158. The court maintained that ifit were "to mandate that courts determine whether
the distributor's offer actually was at fair market value, distributors could rarely rest com
fortably that their offer would eventually be determined by the court to be fair market
value." Stalky, 830 F.2d at 485.
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The court in Kessler feared that an objective standard based on a
range of fair market value would make the court an arbiter between
different appraisal methods and figures and would require an extensive
inquiry by the court into the business practices of the franchisor. 159
While the Slatky standard would require scrutiny of appraisals to as
certain a range of fair market values, the standard used in Kessler
would similarly result in an extensive judicial inquiry ... The court
would be called upon to evaluate the franchisor's method of valuation
of the property as determined through the franchisor's normal course
of its business. Not only is the "normal course qf business" internal to
the franchisor, and, thus, subject to abuse by the interested party; but
as the Slatky court noted, "[t]he mere following of reasonable proce
dures ... does not necessarily result in a reaspnable estiplate."l60
Thus, the term "bona fide" can only be fully understood through
a contextual analysis. The court of appeals in Slatky, in determining
the meaning of "bona fide" within section 2802 of the PMPA, per
formed such a contextual analysis and a~ved at an objective interpre
tation of "bona fide." The approach of Brownstein, followed by
Kessler and the district court in Slatky, focuses only upon the diction
ary definition of "bona fide." The SUbjective standard which the
Brownstein court lays out is an inadequate, short-sighted interpreta
tion which fails to reflect a linguistically comprehensive construction.
Even if the literal interpretation of the words "bona fide" themselves
do not compel an objective definition, the legislative intent of the
PMPA, explored in the next section, mandates that the words be given
such a reading.
B.

Legislative Intent

The specific PMPA provision which requires that the offer for
sale be. "bona fide" was not discussed in the legislative history of the
PMPA. However, an objective interpretation of "bona fide" as set out
in Slatky best comports with the overriding purposes of the Act. By
requiring that the offer price reflect a range of fair market values, the
court guarantees to the franchisee an offer price based upon the reali
ties of the marketplace. The subjective "bona fide offer" standard set
out in Brownstein and Kessler could result in an offer price based upon
the franchisor's alternative business plans or its desire to reap a huge
profit because of the franchisee's special attachment to the property.
These possibilities do not afford the franchisee the protections which
159. Kessler, 670 F. Supp. at 860.
160. Slalky, 830 F.2d at 485.
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Congress contemplated by the passage of the PMP A. Furthermore, in
Brach v. Amoco Oil Co. ,161 the SeventhCircuieCourt of Appeals urged
that the PMPA "must be given a liberal construction consistent with
its overriding purpose to protect franchisees."162
The intended beneficiary of the Act's remedial provisions is the
small-time petroleum marketing franchisee. 163 The Senate Report be
gins with the statement:
Title I establishes protection for franchisees from arbitrary or dis
criminatory termination or nonrenewal of their franchises. The title
prohibits a franchisor from terminating a franchise during the term
of the franchise agreement and from failing to renew the relation
ship at the expiration of the franchise term, unless the termination
or nonrenewal is based upon a ground specified or described in the
legislation and is executed in accordance with the notice require
ments of the legislation. l64

The PMPA was passed as a result of the major oil companies pursuing
a policy of termination and nonrenewal, thwarting the expectations of
the franchisee that the franchise relationship was to be a continuirig
one. 165
An objective reading of "bona fide" best comports with Congress'
stated goals of protecting the franchisee's reasonable expectation of
continuing the franchise relationship. 166 Congress intended the words
"bona fide" to qualify the offer price in order to protect the franchisee
from an unreasonably high offer price which would preclude his
purchasing the business. The court in Slatky suggested that a
franchisor who wished to retain the premises to further its own busi
161. 677 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1982). In Brach, the court held that, in reviewing a
franchisor's business decision not to renew a franchise relationship, the PMPA first re
quires that the decision be made in "good faith" and, second, that the determination be
made "in the normal course of business." Id. at 1222.
It was this business decision not to renew the franchise which the Slatky court distin
guished from the determination of the offer price, characterized by the Slatky court as a
"compliance judgment." Slatky, 830 F.2d at 481. See supra notes 53-61 and accompany
ing text.
162. Brach, 677 F.2d at 1221.
163. See supra Section I.
164. S. REP., supra note II, at 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS at 874.
165. The Senate Report stated that "[i]t is also important to note that often the rea
sonable expectations of the parties to a motor fuel franchise are that the relationship will be
a continuing one. This expectation by the franchisee, in particular, is often the result of,
and fostered by, statements and actions ofthe franchisor." [d. at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 876.

166. [d.
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ness plans would set an offer price out of reach of the franchisee. 167 A
franchisor may wish to alter the premises, replace the premises, or use
it for a different purpose. If the "bona fide offer" requirement were
based on the sUbjective standard set out in Brownstein and Kessler, a
franchisor could, to further its own business plans, set an exorbitant
offer price and thwart the franchisee's expectation that his business
continue. The "bona fide" offer which is made to the franchisee must
be based on a range of fair market values in order to advance the con
gressional goal of protecting the franchisee's expectation of a continu
ing franchise relationship.
In addition, Congress' intent to equalize the disparity of bargain
ing power between franchisor and franchisee 168 is furthered by an in
terpretation of "bona fide offer" based on objective criteria. The court
in Slatky suggested that "[t]he special desire of a franchisee to main
tain the property with which he has worked is exactly what produces
the distributor's general bargaining advantage."169 The franchisee is
unlike other potential buyers of the property because he or she has a
strong personal commitment to the property based upon the effort he
or she has put into the business in the past. This commitment places
him or her at a disadvantage in terms of his bargaining position at the
time of sale. The Brownstein/Kessler SUbjective interpretation of
"bona fide offer" would allow a franchisor to set an especially high
offer price if it thought the franchisee would pay it because of his or
her personal commitment to the business and to this particular prop
erty. However, if "bona fide" is given an objective meaning, the
franchisor is constrained by an appraisal based on a range of fair mar
ket values. The bargaining positions between the franchisor and fran
chisee are equalized because the offer price reflects the reality of the
marketplace, rather than resulting from the unique relationship be
tween franchisor and franchisee. Thus, in determining whether "bona
fide" should be given a subjective or objective meaning, an objective
interpretation is much more promotive of Congress' specified intent of
equalizing the disparity of bargaining power between franchisor and
franchisee.
While the "bona fide offer" provision of the PMPA was not spe
cifically addressed in the congressional history, the term "in good
faith," which the PMPA imposes upon the economic decision by the
167.
168.
NEWS at
169.

Slatky, 830 F.2d at 484.
S. REP., supra note II, at 18, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
877.
Slatky, 830 F.2d at 484.
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franchisor not to renew,170 was discussed. When a franchisor deter
mines that the renewal of a franchise relationship is likely to be un
economical to it, the franchisor is allowed not to renew the franchise,
if such a determination was made "in good faith and in the normal
course of business." 171
The legislative history reveals that with the "in good faith" re
quirement, Congress sought "to preclude sham determinations from
being used as an artifice for termination or nonrenewal." 172 Congress
presumed that the tests of "in good faith" and "in the normal course
of business" provided:
adequate protection of franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory
termination or nonrenewal, yet avoid judicial scrutiny of the busi
ness judgment itself. Thus, it is not necessary for the courts to de
termine whether a particular marketing strategy, such as a market
withdrawal, or the conversion of leased marketing premises to a use
other than the sale or distribution of motor fuel, is a wise business
decision. 173

The court in Slatky suggested that a sUbjective interpretation of "bona
fide" would permit judicial deference both to the business judgment
not to renew and to the franchisor's sense of the fairness of its offer
price. 174 Franchisors would, thus, 'be allowed "to 'eat their cake and
have it too.' "175 The court contended that such an interpretation mis
reads the legislative history. 176
One court of appeals case and one district court case have inter
preted the "bona fide offer" provision of section 2802 when the offer
has included only the real property and not the gasoline storage tanks.
These cases differ from the line of cases discussing the bona fides of the
offer price because they deal with what property must be included in
the offer for the offer to be "bona fide" rather than the bona fides of
the particular price. These cases are presented because they attest to
the courts' concern with effectuating Congress' goals of equalizing the
disparity of bargaining power between the franchisee and
franchisor. 177 Moreover, these cases typify the courts' liberal interpre
170. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D) (1982).
171. Id.
172. S. REP., supra note 11, at 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS at 896.
173. Id.
174. Slatky, 830 F.2d at 481. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
175. Id. at 482.
176. Id.
177. S. REP., supra note 11, at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS at 877.
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tation of the PMPA in favor of protecting the franchisee.
In Roberts v. Amoco Oil Co., J78 the court looked to the broader
dual purposes of the PMPA in remedying the disparity of bargaining
power between franchisor and franchisee and in preserving the com
petitive influence of the independent franchisee in the marketplace. I79
These ends would be defeated if the franchisor were allowed to ex
clude from its offer of sale to the franchisee the equipment necessary
for the continuation of the business. ISO Similarly, in Greco v. Mobil Oil
Corp. ,181 the court noted that when reviewing a question under the
PMPA, a court should be guided by the principle that remedial legis
lation, such as this, should be given a liberal construction with its pur
pose to protect franchisees. 182
The holdings in Roberts and Greco il1dicate a resolve on the part
of the courts to effectuate the congressional intent of the PMPA to
protect the franchisee. Similarly, in the interpretation of the "bona
178. 740 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1984). In Roberts, a franchisee brought suit against
Amoco contending that Amoco's offer to sell its service station- excluding the gasoline
pumps, dispensers, storage tanks, piping and other equipment- was not a "bona fide" offer
under the PMPA. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that "a 'bona fide'
offer to sell leased marketing premises under the PMPA must include ... the equipment
used in distributing motor fue1." Id. at 607.
179. Id. at 606.
180. Id.
181. 597 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ill. 1984). In Greco, a Mobil franchisee brought suit
seeking an injunction of Mobil's termination of the franchise. Id. Mobil had offered Greco
a right of first refusal of a third party's contract, but, because the contract between Mobil
and the third party was only for the sale of the land and not the personal property of the
station, the right of first refusal made to Greco was only for the land. Id. at 470. Because
Mobil violated the PMPA by not making Greco a proper offer to purchase, the court held
that the franchisee was entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting termination of the
franchise. Id. at 474.
182. Id. at 471 (citing Brach v. Amoco Oil Co., 677 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1982». In a
third case, Tobias v. Shell Oil Co., 782 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1986), a franchisee brought a
similar suit under the PMPA claiming that Shell's offer of sale was not "bona fide" because
Shell did not include the underground gasoline storage tanks in its offer. These steel tanks
(three of which had been in use for twenty years, one for seventeen years, and one for
thirteen years) were not included in the offer because of their age and the risk of leaking.
Id. at 1173. Shell introduced evidence of its program of systematically replacing its steel
underground tanks with fiberglass ones, having already made such replacements in five
sixths of the stations in Tobias' region. Essentially deciding the issue on environmental
grounds, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Shell did fulfill its obligation
to make a "bona fide" offer even though the offer did not include the faulty storage tanks.
Id. at 1174.
Tobias can be easily distinguished from Roberts and Greco because the court's reason
ing was essentially based on environmental issues rather than on the PMPA. The court in
Tobias held that, because Shell formulated its offer through its regular corporate proce
dures and because Tobias was not singled out for unfair treatment regarding the tanks,
Shell had satisfied its obligations under the PMPA. Id. at 1174.
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fide offer" provision, an objective guideline, such as a range of fair
market values, is necessary to protect the franchisee. The court in
Slatky stated that requiring only that the franchisor make a subjective
good faith offer would enable franchisors "to pursue their own, unfet
tered self-interest, [and] the statute does not generally guarantee dis
tributors that right."183
Thus, an objective standard better effectuates the dual congres
sional goals of protection of the franchisee and equalizing the bargain
ing positions between the parties. Both Slatky and Kim present
judicial solutions based on the objective standards of fair market value.
However, the approach advanced by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Slatky better protects the interests of the franchisee
than does the procedure set out in Kim.
Like the range of fair market value standard set by the Slatky
court, the district court in Kim 184 based its standard on objective crite
ria, i.e., the fair market value of the property. However, the court in
Kim held that, when a franchisee makes a prima facie case that the
offer price was above fair market value as assessed by appraisers, the
burden of proof shifts to the franchisor to articulate its reasons for
raising the price. The Kim standard requires that the franchisor "de
scribe its procedures for arriving at offer prices to franchisees; listing
the criteria it uses; demonstrating that those procedures and criteria
were applied in the instant case; and articulating its reasons for raising
the offering price above the fair market value as determined by ap
praisers."18S In Kim, the court held that the franchisor had satisfied
its burden of proof because the property had appreciated at a rate of
approximately 1% per month since the initial appraisal and the
franchisor successfully proved that the offer price reflected this general
increase in value. 186
However, the Slatky resolution is more protective of the interests
of the franchisee because both parties would present appraisals repre
senting a range of fair market values. An offer of sale based upon the
.fair market value of the property guarantees to the franchisee that the
offer price is based on the economic realities of the marketplace. The
offer is made to the franchisee as though the franchisee were any other
buyer of the property and as though the franchisor and franchisee
were in equal bargaining positions. In Kim, once the burden of proof
183.
184.
185.
186.

Stalky, 830 F.2d at 483.
See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
Kim, No. CV 85-4689 at 34.
Id. at 16-17.
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is shifted, the standard falls prey to the same defects found in the
Brownstein and Kessler sUbjective standard: , the factors and tests em
ployed are internal and subject both to abuse and to error. As the
court of appeals in Slatky stated, "[t]he mere following of reasonable
procedures, however, does not necessarily result in a reasonable
estimate." 187
The court in Kim actually does little more for the franchisee than
did Brownstein and Kessler. Once the threshold of fair market value is
passed, the standard is essentially the same as the sUbjective standard.
If a franchisee is to be guaranteed equal bargaining power with the
franchisor in the sale of the business, as mandated by the provisions of
the PMPA, he or she must be made an offer that is within a range of
fair market values. It is only by such an objective standard that bona
fides can be guaranteed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Title I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act has succeeded
in eliminating arbitrary and discriminatory terminations and
nonrenewals of petroleum marketing franchise relationships. 188 How
ever, the congressional goals of equalizing the disparity of bargaining
power between franchisor and franchisee and of protecting the fran
chisee's expectation of a continuing relationship will not be fully real
ized until the franchisee is given a realistic opportunity to continue
operating the business he or she has struggled to build. By requiring
that the franchisor's offer of sale upon its nonrenewal decision be
"bona fide," Congress sought to protect the franchisee from an offer
price beyond his or her reach.
Statutory interpretation based solely upon the literal, plain mean
ing of a text, the approach taken by the court in Brownstein, is often
inadequate in determining the meaning of a statute. 189 The fact that a
statute has been interpreted differently by different courts is evidence
that its meaning is ambiguous and unclear and that further inquiry is
required.
The court of appeals in Slatky examined the contextual meaning
of "bona fide" and found that, in many different statutory contexts,
courts employ an objective standard to determine "bona fide."190 The
requirement in the PMPA that the franchisor's offer of sale upon its
187.
188.
189.
190.

Slatky, 830 F.2d at 485.
Kleeger, supra note 13, at 316.
See supra text accompanying notes 109-119.
See supra text accompanying notes 120-160.
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nonrenewal decision be "bona fide" must be read in reference to objec
tive guidelines, such as a range of fair market values, if the provision of
the Act is to have any meaningful significance. Shifting the burden of
proof to the franchisor to prove why the offer price exceeds the fair
market value, the position espoused" by the district court in Kim, does
initially rely on objective criteria. However, once the burden of proof
is shifted in Kim, the offer price is susceptible to internal manipulation
or mistake, just as it was in the Brownstein/Kessler subjective
standard.
Thus, an analysis of the ambiguous plain meaning of the term
"bona fide," the contextual interpretation, and the legislative history
of the PMPA indicate that judicial interpretation of the "bona fide
offer" of sale requirement of the PMPA be based upon objective crite
ria such as a range of fair market values. The approach taken by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Slatky sets such a standard.
,
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